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Abstract
Mobile computing devices have become an essential part of everyday life and are becoming
the primary means for collecting and storing sensitive personal and corporate data.
Android is, by far, the dominant mobile platform, which makes its permissions model
responsible for securing the vast majority of this sensitive data.
The current model falls well short of actual user needs, as permission assignments are
made statically at installation time. Therefore, it is impossible to implement dynamic
security policies that could be applied selectively depending on context. Users are forced to
unconditionally trust installed apps without means to isolate them from sensitive data.
We describe a new approach, app sanitization, which automatically instruments apps at
installation time, such that users can dynamically grant and revoke individual permissions.
The main advantage of our technique is that it runs in userspace and utilizes standard
aspect-oriented methods to incorporate custom security controls into the app.

Keywords: android; security; privacy; permissions; instrumentation; aspect oriented
programming; appsanitizer
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1. Introduction
The introduction of the first iPhone in 2007 marked the transition of mobile devices,
such as cell phones, from specialized platforms into general purpose computers whose
functionality can be extended by installing third-party applications (a.k.a. apps). Over time,
the Android platform became the dominant standard with over a billion devices currently
in active use and over a million applications are available from the Google Play app store
[18]. Installing any of these applications requires a certain level of trust on part of the user,
as most apps are given access to sensitive user information.
The user is given some control over the process as apps need explicit permission to
access various data and hardware resources on the device, such as contact information,
GPS location, microphone, camera, etc. Unfortunately, the Android permissions model does
not provide users with enough control over the installed apps, which can easily result in
loss of privacy, and has potentially serious security implications in corporate
environments.
Android Permissions Framework
With few exceptions, Android applications are written in Java and executed by a
special virtual machine (VM) known as Dalvik. The Dalvik VM consumes bytecode that is in
a proprietary format; however, it can also be translated to and from standard Java bytecode
format.
For an application to gain access to protected data or resources on a device, a
permission must be obtained from the system [23]. Each application uses its manifest file to
declare at installation time the permissions it needs; during the installation process, the
user is given the choice of agreeing to the requested permissions on an all-or-nothing basis.
That is, either the application is installed with the full complement of permissions it
requested, or not at all. Once permissions are granted, the application has them for life and
the user is never consulted again. The only way to revoke a permission is to uninstall the
application altogether.
A permission can be defined by individual developers, but normally exists in a set
contained within the stock Android operating system. If these are not included in the
metadata, but the application attempts to use a resource under their jurisdiction anyway, a
security exception is thrown and access is denied. Once agreed, the application can use the
set of application programming interfaces (APIs) within the Android OS to access protected
resources. At access time, the Package Manager is utilized by the API to perform
application authentication for the specified resource. It is notable that no check is
necessary on the developer’s part—Android automatically handles the permission
enforcement on every access.
Problems with Android Permissions Framework
There are several problems with the described permissions model; all stem from the
overall focus on ease of use and the shortsighted view of the resulting weaknesses with
1

respect to security and privacy. To understand these problems, we consider several
representative use cases and show the resulting problems.
Over-provisioned
provisioned applications
In our first case, Alice (who is an average user) wants to install a simple flashlight
app. She would likely start by going to the Play Store and search for “flashlight”—hundreds
“flashlight”
of results will follow,
llow, and for such a simple application she is likely to pick a free one.
Additionally, she is conscious of picking a well
well-respected
respected application, so she always checks
for a high
rating in the 5star
system.
The number
one
result
(Super-Bright
LED
Flashlight) is
free and ranks
over a 4.75 out
of 5 (stars)
Figure 1-1 Simple Flashlight App
based
on
about 560,000
reviews. Absent any technical expertise, picking that app is a perfectly rationale choice, as
illustrated by the more than 10 million installations
installations, with the store advertisement show in
Figure 1-1.
At the installation step, Alice is presented with the permissions request shown in
Figure 1-2:
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Figure 1-2 Permissions Requred (Partial Listing)

At this point, our average user is more than likely to grant the permissions
requested as she probably does not fully understand the egregious nature of the requested
permissions grab. The only criterion she can rely on is reputation, which in the absence of
technical expertise gets substituted for trustworthiness.
From
rom a technical perspective, the app is over-provisioned as the only permission
required for the stated purpose of the application is ‘control flashlight’;; whatever other
functionality is built into the app has a different purpose that users are ill-equipped
equipped to
judge. We can surmise that most of it is tied to identifying and tracking the device, and to
presumably serve targeted ads
ads—the source of income for the developer.
Over-provisioning
provisioning is root
rooted amongst several possible causes. From the app
developer’s perspective, there are monetary incentives to ask for everything
ng they can get
their hands on; advertisers live and die on the ability to deliver ads the user will pay
attention to, and any information
tion attainable that might aid that purpose. Additionally,
user’s lack of recourse empowers developers’ mindsets when asking for permissions.
Unfortunately, Google—
—the owner of Android—has no incentive to minimize
advertiser influence as the compan
company is driven on an advertisement business model. It is not
surprising, then, to learn that 70% of all apps collect data irrelevant to the main function of
3

the application [17]; one advertisement library alone is installed on over 350,000 unique
applications [10]. While no law governs the disclosure of a user’s personal information in
this manner, most users do not understand the amount of data that apps collect on them.
Even supposing it is the case that users and developers fully understand and accept
this permissions framework (along with its implications), malicious applications take
advantage of this state of affairs. These second order consequences are serious threats, as
demonstrated with malware designed to hijack an application and redelegate their access
to a different, arbitrary application [14]. This type of attack is able to utilize the interapplication communications infrastructure to perform a privileged task without the
attacking application having such privileges.
The net effect of over-provisioned apps is twofold: an increased attack surface, and
an increased exposure of personal information. These problems are exacerbated both by
the user’s lack of recourse and the static way in which permission policies are
implemented.

Static policy assignment
Consider Bob, who, working as a manager, has access to important company
information; additionally, he uses his mobile phone to conduct everyday business actions.
If Bob were to install an application that had access to the camera and/or microphone, as
well as network access, that application could surreptitiously record audio and/or take
pictures and send them to unknown parties. Since Bob works with company trade secrets,
this scenario is especially serious as anything within line of sight to the phone can be
captured and important conversation could be eavesdropped upon.
This proof of concept attack has been successfully demonstrated on Android devices
[15]. Any application (including completely legal and well-respected apps) asking for
camera rights could carry out this attack. The attack vector involves taking pictures of the
user’s surroundings, without his knowledge, and sending the images to the remote
attacker; in turn, the images are combined into a visual 3D model of his environment.
Other sophisticated attacks utilize the device’s built-in accelerometers to capture
keystrokes when the phone is placed near a keyboard. Furthermore, and as discussed
earlier, applications are vulnerable to permission redelegation, further increasing the
attack surface.
The cause of these problems is not that the application has been over-provisioned;
instead the simple fact is that permissions are being abused. The inability for users to do
anything about this is because of the static manner in which these permissions have been
assigned.
A static permissions model means that once an application has been given a
permission, it cannot be modified. That is, once a user agrees an application can use the
microphone, it can access the microphone at any time it chooses and in whatever manner
the application chooses. This is exacerbated by the fact that a user has only one choice
when installing an application – either to grant the application everything it asks for, or to
not install the application.
4

Alternatively, dynamic permissions would allow the users to enable or disable
permissions on a per application basis. Using our process, users must initially accept
everything the application asks for. However, they can then turn on/off individual
permissions for individual applications through an easy to understand user interface. In
addition, information resources (such as contacts) can be faked, which will allow the
application to function as normal but with completely false data.

Confusing and coarsely-grained permissions
Users are presented with a synopsis of needed permissions when installing an app.
Presupposing that users take the time to read the explanation for each permission, it is
doubtful whether they understand the implications behind each one. Specifically, users
exhibit problems caused by confusing category headings, disparities between permissions
and risk, inability to reason about the absence of permissions, and warning fatigue [19].
Confusing Category Headings Overly broad category headings manifest
themselves in many cases. In particular, the READ_PHONE_STATE permission, under the
heading “Phone Calls”, leads some users to believe companies have permission to market
their number to telemarketers. The READ_CONTACTS permission under “Personal
Information” leads other users to believe that the application would have access to their
stored passwords. Asked whether or not a given application had permissions to read their
text messages, users are able to accurately answer only 38% of the time.
Unclear Risks of making Resources Available Connecting warnings to risk is
troublesome for users as well, even if the terms of the warnings in the permission are
understood. For example, the warning that an application can have “full Internet access”
leaves much to the imagination – the user must draw their own conclusions as to the risks
involved with accepting that statement.
Absence of Permissions Because of the over 100 default permissions possible for
the application to ask for, users lose track of or even forget permissions exist. Thus, when
one is missing, they are not likely to notice. This leads to assessing a similar permission,
which is asked for, as overly broad in scope.
Warning Fatigue Warning fatigue is unavoidable and contributes to the challenge
of securing personal data. Instead of meeting this challenge with improved warnings or
reducing low-risk warnings, it is better to change the model altogether by offering the user
the option to give or take permissions individually. The user should be presented with a list
of permissions the application asks for, with a checkbox (defaulted to ‘unchecked’) for each
one, indicating if the application should have access to that particular resource. This way,
the user is forced to think about what she is giving up instead of blankly accepting a risk
she is tired of thinking about.
With a dynamic permissions model these issues would be circumvented if not
rendered invalid. Additionally, we can specify our own permissions in as fine grain a
manner as we wish and have them individually granted or revoked. In this fashion, security
conscious users would have no qualms about what a particular application is asking for.
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Previous solutions have been presented which implement additional protection,
giving users control of protected resources. There are three general approaches when
implementing additional resource protections: 1) return the resource unaltered, 2) deny
any access to the resource, and 3) return fictitious or masked versions of the resource.
Trusted apps can be given access to personal information, while untrusted apps can be fed
fictitious data. The ability to return fictitious data is important as applications are expecting
to have access to resources for which they were originally designed to use; with a denial of
access, the app may behave erratically.
These solutions all wrest control from the application at various points in the control
flow in order to implement additional security measures.

Figure 2-1 Android Architecture

In this representation of Android’s architecture (Figure 2-1), there are several
modules involved in executing an application's call for data. Each one of them is a control
point that can be used to incorporate a custom security mechanism. Figure 2-2 lists the
control points used by previous solutions:
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Control point
Content Providers/System Services
Android’s Package Manager
Application layer (user-space)

Solution
MockDroid, TISSA
FlaskDroid
Dr. Android & Mr. Hide

Figure 2-2 Prior Solutions
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MockDroid
MockDroid intercepts the control flow at the System Framework level, within the
kernel. Developed by Beresford et al. [1], it provides false information to apps if the user
declares them untrusted. For example, they are able to return a constant, ‘false’, device id
when an untrusted application attempts to read the device id.

Modification from Android OS

Figure 2-3 MockDroid

This approach relies on modifying both the security checks as well as the content
provider libraries. The package manager service is the central node for Android security.
Because every API interfacing sensitive data accesses the package manager, this is a perfect
opportunity to intercept control flow.
7

MockDroid implements application access verification within Android’s package
manager class. If the decision is made to ‘mock the data’, the customized package manager
returns control to the content providers, indicating the user’s decision.
When a content provider receives a request from an application for which the user
declares untrusted, an empty data set will be returned. If, on the other hand, the user has
only allowed the application to have ‘mocked’ data, “plausible but incorrect” results, such
as a falsified last names, are returned to the application.
This approach implements dynamic permissions; however, it involves low level
modification within the kernel. Rewriting part of an operating system, although providing a
robust solution, is not without drawbacks, and we revisit the issue later in this chapter.
Furthermore, MockDroid was not demonstrated to be effective for several types of sensors
and data; only one or two types of data are protected with this system.

FlaskDroid
At the 2013 USENIX Security Symposium, a group of researchers presented their
work on an improved Android security architecture. This work was realized as a
framework dubbed FlaskDroid [5].
FlaskDroid is an implementation of the Flask architecture [21], with heavy
inspiration from SELinux (or, in this case, SE Android). Flask is a Linux operating system
implementing flexible security policies, and is now incorporated into SELinux (a popular
security conscious distribution).
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Figure 2-4 FlaskDroid

In this architecture, the major change is the way in which access policies are
implemented. There are three central components that constrict application access to a
minimum: Context Providers, a Security Server, and a Policy Database. These are in
addition to modifications to kernel components such as content providers.
When a system library such as a content provider queries for data, it first reaches
the newly implemented user-space security server. This server implements policy
decisions based on input previously received from the user. Depending on the outcome of
that verification, the calling app is allowed access to the data.
In addition to the standard resource APIs, this approach also takes into
consideration a malicious application that has gained root access. To protect against such a
threat, policy checks are enforced at the syscall level. This means that were a malicious
application to attempt a MAC level query, FlaskDroid would be able to intercept the call and
respond appropriately.
The vetted nature of the Flask operating system, and by extension the FlaskDroid
operating system, provides for a sound approach to policy management. In addition,
FlaskDroid protects from malware with root access.
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The major drawback this approach exhibits is consistent with other work –
extensive modification of the operating system is required.
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Dr. Android and Mr. Hide
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide are two processes that work together to intercept control
flow of the app within the Application layer and execute entirely in user space [16].

Modification from Android OS

Figure 2-5 Dr. Android Mr. Hide

Dr. Android and Mr. Hide instrument target applications. Instrumentation is the act
of modifying a program’s bytecode representation without having access to the source
code. This is possible because strongly-typed interpreted languages use an intermediate
representation, known as bytecode, which retains all necessary symbolic information,
allowing additional code to be spliced in.
The instrumented version of the app is almost exact replica of the original
application, except that calls using privacy-related APIs are replaced with calls to a
modified implementation of the API. This duplicate API, loaded into userspace, will cause
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the application to exhibit a new behavior when utilizing methods within it. For example,
the duplicated API might block network access if the request is to a known malicious URI.
Written in OCaml, the instrumentation mechanisms are non-trivial to use for the
average Java developer. Additionally, this approach relies on up-to-date Android APIs,
which are continuously updated over time. Finally, this method does not provide dynamic
control of permission revocation.
Drawbacks
These methods presented have achieved securing sensitive data and resources on
the Android platform. However, to implement these features in most of the methods above,
a modification of Android source code is required. The fallout from this simple fact is far
reaching. Some of these disadvantages include:
•
•
•

•

Recompilation of the Android operating system is necessary
Custom ROM is needed to install the new version of the operating system
Future updates released for the Android operating system are not likely to be
folded into the custom operating system
o Future updates released for the Android operating system could
break the way these modifications work
Technical knowledge is needed to flash ROMs and reinstall operating
systems on mobile devices

Since Android is open source, developers can easily change source code and
recompile the system. However, the sheer size and complexity behind operating systems
can inhibit kernel hackers from doing this in a robust manner. Modifications to such
complex systems are likely to have unintended, unsafe, and insecure consequences. For
this reason, warranties on mobile devices are generally voided upon installation of such
changes.
These devices are, by design, resistant to installation of unverified software; a user
must first overwrite such built-in security mechanisms. This process includes flashing new
Read Only Memory (ROM) to the device, which in turn disables verification of the update
being pushed. If the user then trusts the source of the new operating system, he will be able
to install the operating system. Should any step in this dubious process fail, it is possible for
the device to become ‘bricked’, effectively rendering the device useless. In these situations,
and if it is possible in the given situation, the user usually resorts to restoring the device to
the as-purchased state. The majority of Android users cannot be expected to exhibit this
level of technical knowledge.
Another drawback of using a custom operating system is that updates to the original
operating system are not necessarily going to be installed on the device. This fact alone
should discourage installation of unsupported constructs. Should the custom operating
system implement updates from Android, it is possible that updates to any part of the
kernel interfere with the customizations made, making the device more unstable if usable
at all.
Despite the number of drawbacks, there are some important advantages to a kernel
space solution, the largest of which is that it provides a higher level of assurance by
11

ensuring that protection is not circumvented. In particular, if malware were to gain root
access on the device, it is still possible to protect the resources. Separately, apps can be run
as-is with no need for modification.
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide, while providing the advantage of making all modifications
solely in userspace, does not allow for a dynamic permissions model. In addition, it must
continuously update its libraries to match that of the current API release. Finally, the
instrumentation must be written in OCaml, which would have a relatively steep learning
curve.
To eliminate the largest of these drawbacks, while still achieving the same goals, we
developed a method that allows any application to be automatically instrumented with our
sanitization process, thereby giving us control at important junctions in the flow of the
program. Based on that, we implement a dynamic, user-defined permissions model that
effectively supersedes the default one.
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3. New Approach: Aspect-Oriented Programming
We have developed a methodology to transform applications such that users can
control how these applications access protected resources. The idea is similar to the one
proposed by Jeon et al. [16], in that it uses bytecode instrumentation as a means to
intercept the control flow of the application within user space. However, instead of using a
custom bytecode instrumentation tool (written in OCaml), we utilize an aspect-oriented
programming (AOP) approach, which allows us to write the control code in Java, and splice
it into the original application using the de facto standard Java AOP implementation,
AspectJ [8]. The benefits of the approach are threefold: a) developers of the access control
enforcement point can utilize the Android environment; b) our implementation does not
require the tracking and replication of the rapidly evolving Android SDK capabilities; and c)
it reduces access-control-induced latency by performing the checks inside the application’s
process.
Bytecode instrumentation with AspectJ
As discussed earlier, Android applications are compiled into a series of instructions
prior to execution. These instructions – the bytecode – are then interpreted by the Dalvik
virtual machine. Instrumentation is the act of modifying these instructions. For instance,
we can modify every instruction accessing personal data to instead return an empty data
set. Aspect oriented programming gives us the ability to find every set of such instructions.
Suppose we wish to modify a query into the contacts database. The normal call is of
the form:
query
public final Cursor query(Uri uri,
String[] projection,
String selection,
String[] selectionArgs,
String sortOrder)
Query the given URI, returning a Cursor over the result set.
Parameters:
uri - The URI, using the content:// scheme, for the content to retrieve.
projection - A list of which columns to return.
selection - A filter declaring which rows to return.
selectionArgs - The values will be bound as Strings.
sortOrder - How to order the rows
Returns:
A Cursor object, which is positioned before the first entry, or null

13

AspectJ can modify the query prior to execution yet after arguments have been
assigned values. We will selectively modify the query to return an
n empty cursor by
changing the query’s selection criteria
criteria.

Figure 3--1 Code to implement when accessing contacts

3-1 will, conditionally, shut off access to a database. If it
Thee code shown in Figure 3
passes a conditional branch, line 33, it will append a false condition, “where
where 0”,
0 line 36, to
the query’s criteria.. When the program executes the query to get a cursor to the contacts
database, it will necessarily find nothing – a cursor pointing to an empty dataset.
dataset The
proceed function is how an aspect hands control back to the application in order for
control flow
low to resume as normal; in this case, the query will execute and return its result
to the application.
Now that we have the code we want to run, we find all points in the application that
access the contacts database. Aspect oriented programming is the ideal paradigm to follow
in this case. With it, we are able to crosscut the entire application, applying advice
(additional or modified behavior) at all join points (specified locations within the
application code) we specify.
Our join point for contacts looks like the following:

Figure 3-2 Pointcut Breakdown

The name of the pointcut is used when defining the advice type later in the aspect. The cut
type ‘call’ is used to weave when the function is cal
called
led within the original program. The
return type can be used to more exactly filter what methods we want to weave throughout
the target program. With the wildcard ‘*’, it will match any return type. Next is the name of
the function, here ‘query.. This specifies the name of the function(s) we want to weave.
While this supports wildcards, as well as classpath filtering, we limit our weave points to
the function name. The last part of the pointcut to defi
define
ne is the argument specification. In
our example, we allow any number of arguments.
14

The final step remaining combines the code we want to execute at the pointcuts we
specify within a single object. This object is known as an aspect.

1. public aspect aspect24adba4 {
2.
pointcut anyQuery (Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selec
tionArgs, String sortOrder)
: call(* query(..))
3.
4.
&& args(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder)
&& within ( (com.google.ads.u) || .... );
5.
6.
Object around(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
7.
s, String sortOrder)
8.
: anyQuery(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder) {
try {
9.
10.
if (accessingContactsDatabase()) {
if (blockContacts == false){
11.
12.
//do nothing
System.out.println("[!]Allowing access to contacts");
13.
14.
} else {
15.
//block access
16.
System.out.println("[!]Blocking access to contacts");
17.
selection = selection + “ where 1 > 2 ”;
18.
}
19.
}
} catch (Exception e) {
20.
21.
System.out.println(e);
}
22.
23.
return proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);
24.
}

Figure 3-3 Contact Blocking Aspect

This aspect, show in Figure 3-3, will utilize a pointcut to capture all calls within the
application’s code matching the function name “query” (line 3). Additional requirements
are imposed on the pointcut, assuring that any matched functions both have specified
arguments and exist within a specified classpath. These additional restrictions allow us to
specify what classes we weave into; without8 them, we could potentially instrument more
bytecode than we wish to. Lines 7 and 8 declare that the following code should be applied
around all found pointcuts matching the criteria. The ‘around’ advice is used when we want
to modify the functionality at weaving point; alternative types of advice can modify control
flow either before or after the weaving point.
A graphical representation of this flow is represented with Figure 3-4.
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Figure 3-4 AppSanitizer

After applying aspects to the application, the requests going to the system
framework (denoted with the ‘1’ and intercepted control line), have been weaved based on
our advice. Instrumenting bytecode in this fashion leaves both the application and
operating system agnostic to the fact that we’ve gained control.
Automation
We have built a process to automatically perform bytecode instrumentation.
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The first step in the
process is attaining the target
application file. While the routine
method involves visiting Google’s
Play Store, .apks can
n be installed
from any source. For our
purposes, we utilized open
source libraries that crawl the
Play Store, downloading apps as
if it were an Android device. This
was successful in downloading
about 100 applications before
being blocked by Google’s
servers. A more effective method,
although
lthough
not
autonomous
autonomous,
involves a third party extension
for
Google
Chrome
Chrome,
ApkDownloader.
Once the .apk has been
downloaded, we begin the
process
of
implementing
additional security measures. The
format of an .apk archive allows
us to unzip the file and gain
access to the bytecode. This code
is in an Android specific format,
Dalvik bytecode.. In order to
utilize well-established tools, we
convert the Dalvik
ik bytecode back
to Java bytecode thereby granting
use of tools made specifically to
study, modify, and rebuild Java
bytecode (such as AspectJ). This
conversion process is performed
with the Dex2Jar suite of tools,
Figure 3-5 Sanitation Pipeline
and the output is in Java’s .class
format.
We could immediately begin applying aspects to Java’s bytecode, however, to
minimize the amount of work done when recompiling the instrumented bytecode, we first
want to get a list of all classes we want to weave into. Bash level tools can be utilized for
finding all classes that contain a particular function call. Obfuscation would normally
present a barrier to this method, however since w
we are only weaving calls to the Android
API we can be sure the function definitions remain unchanged. We add all found classes
class
that make these targeted API calls as additional criteria when applying our aspects.
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The aspects are then ready to be applied. The AspectJ tool suite includes a special
compiler, AspectJ compiler, or ajc. We provide ajc with the aspects we’ve defined as well as
all .class files derived from the original Android application. Ajc will apply the aspects to
the bytecode and output a new .jar archive. Still in the Java format, we use another tool in
the Dex2Jar toolchain, jar2dex, to get back to our desired Android format, Dalvik bytecode.
This bytecode, output as a .dex file, replaces the .dex file within the original application’s
archive. With the new bytecode inside its archive, the .apk is ready to be resigned and
reinstalled.
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Instrumentation for Dynamic Permissions
In the Android API, there are only a few ways to utilize or access protected
resources, and we have broken these down by what archetype of resource they are most
closely related to. We focus on Sensors, which includes the camera, network radio, and GPS
radio, as well as Databases, which include contact information, calendar, and account
information. While the functions of resources within these archetypes are not necessarily
similar, the methods to access them through the API are exactly the same; we take
advantage of this fact when applying aspects.
Databases
Databases are used to store many kinds of information within the device. Of
paramount importance to privacy is the contacts database, which stores names, phone
numbers, addresses, photos, and other information. To intercept requests for this data, we
configure our aspects to match the method within the Android API matching ‘cursor
query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection….)’. The first argument in this method
defines what database to pull from by use of a URI. Contact information, for example, is
accessed with the URI “android.provider.ContactsContract.Contacts.CONTENT_URI".
Remaining arguments are used for further defining the query, such as the columns to select
from and the criteria the results must match. When weaving, we only apply additional
security measures to target URIs.
Databases also offer a unique opportunity in that we can provide the calling
application with fake information. We achieve this by copying a database to the device’s
storage that, while identical in schema, has falsified information in it. Within the aspect, we
instead generate a cursor, the Android handler for queries, to the falsified database. When
the cursor is returned to the application, it would have no knowledge it is instead looking
at false information.
An aspect applying this style of advice is the following:
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1. public aspect aspectba818d3 {
2.
private final String NoChange = "0";
private final String Block = "1";
3.
4.
private final String FakeIt = "2";
SanitizedAppData sad = new SanitizedAppData();
5.
6.
7.
pointcut anyQuery (Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
s, String sortOrder)
8.
: call(* query(..))
&& args(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);
9.
10.
Object around(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
11.
s, String sortOrder)
: anyQuery(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder) {
12.
13.
System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code --");
sad.initialize();
14.
15.
16.
try {
if (uriHelper.contactsUri()) {
17.
18.
System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has matched the target URI --");
System.out.println(" -- 'SAD' setting: " + sad.contactsSetting());
19.
20.
if (sad.contactsSetting().equals(NoChange)){
//do nothing
21.
22.
System.out.println("Allowing access to Contacts");
} else if (sad.contactsSetting().equals(Block)) {
23.
24.
//block it by making database query which will break
System.out.println("Blocking Access to Contacts Database");
25.
26.
selection = selection + " and 1 > 2";
} else {
27.
28.
System.out.println(" -Attempting to get into the second database.. --");
Cursor myCursor = fakeContactData(uri, projection, selection, se
29.
lectionArgs, sortOrder);
return myCursor;
30.
31.
}
}
32.
33.
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(" -34.
Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code, but failed to successfully interrupt the sys
tem call --");
35.
System.out.println(e);
proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);
36.
37.
}
return proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);
38.
39.
}
40.
public Cursor fakeContactData(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,Strin
41.
g[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) {
System.out.println("-- Opening Database to /sdcard/contacts2.db --");
42.
43.
SQLiteDatabase myDB = SQLiteDatabase.openOrCreateDatabase("/sdcard/contacts2
.db", null);
44.
return myDB.query("view_contacts", projection, selection, selectionArgs, nul
l, null, null, null);
45.
}
46.
}

Figure 3-6 Contacts Aspect
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Figure 3-6 contains an entire aspect. Combining both the pointcut, lines 7 through 9,
and the advice, lines 11 through 49. The net effect of this aspect is to splice into the
application at any point a ‘query’ function is called with the following logic: a) if the target
database is the contacts database, then b) proceed by following user’s selection by allowing
access to the database, denying access to the database, or returning a cursor to the
alternative database with fake information, and finally c) return the cursor to application,
thereby conceding control back to its original state.
Sensors
The GPS radio is a sensor attached to Android devices. This peripheral is one of the
most unnecessarily requested by applications; ad supported apps generally require it. In
order to activate the radio within code, developers use the high-level procedure
getSystemService(String name), where name is, in this instance, “location”. The returned
object is a LocationManager, which has callback functions for when it is updated. Crafting a
malformed LocationManager, and returning that in place of what the application is
expecting, prevents the application from receiving any kind of update.
An HTTP Download service is built into the API for managing downloads from the
internet. To utilize this method, developers use the same getSystemService(String name)
method, but provide “download” to the procedure. The resulting returned object is of type
DownloadManager. Weaving into this point, we can similarly craft a response preventing
the DownloadManager from completing its download.
1.public aspect aspect262fac6 {
2.
pointcut systemServiceCut(String theString)
3.
: call(* getSystemService(..))
&& args(theString)
4.
5.
&& within(com.QrBarcodeScanner.Encode.*);
6.
Object around(String theString)
7.
8.
: systemServiceCut(theString) {
9.
System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code --");
10.
if (theString.equalsIgnoreCase("download")) {
if (sad.httpDownload().equals(NoChange)){
11.
12.
//do nothing
13.
System.out.println("Allowing access to HTTP Download");
} else if (sad.httpDownload().equals(Block)) {
14.
15.
//block it by returning a bad service
16.
System.out.println(" -- Blocking Download --");
return proceed(" ");
17.
18.
}
19.
}
20.
return proceed(theString);
}
21.
22.
}
Figure 3-7 System Service Aspect
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In order to grant the user the ability to dynamically choose what action to take - to
allow access, to deny access, or in some cases provide fake information – we install an
application on the device to write user decisions to the SD card. Acting as a shared
resource, the SD card is an easy way to share information between the settings application
and the instrumented application. Alternatively, broadcasts and intents could be used,
however this method requires the settings application to be constantly running in the
background as a service. While providing the advantage of no read/write operations to the
SD card, the drawbacks include that Android can kill background =services
services when running
low on memory.
To make these decisions, w
we provide the user a simple GUI.

Figure 33-8 Dynamic Permission Setting

3-8, the user can grant and revoke
Using the application demonstrated in Figure 3
permissions on a per-application
application basis.
Location Based Permissions
In addition to allowing the user to selectively grant and revoke access to individual
permissions, a location based access policy is useful. Within sensitive government
installations,
allations, for instance, no pictures should be taken by any applications. Likewise,
employees in corporate
orporate environments will have a smartphone on or near them; were a
device to be infected with malware, attackers could gain access to valuable company tradetrade
22

secrets. To this end, aspects can be configured to detect whether or not the device is within
a certain distance from a given location. If so, information can be hidden from instrumented
applications, and sensor access can be revoked.
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4. Results
To study the effectiveness of our process, we built a proof of concept process named
‘AppSanitizer’,, and conducted several case studies.
General Usage
Assuming that we have attained a copy of the apk we wish to ‘sanitize’,, we begin the
process by dropping the file into our pipeline.

Figure 4-1 Sanitizer GUI

here are several options for sanitization. While the default is to cut across the
There
entire application, we provide the option to reduce the amount of instrumentation done to
the source application. Upon sanitization
anitization, we see output similar to the following:
following
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58:Sanitizer cdstelly$ SanitizeAPK.py -c true -a DWApp.apk
[*] Beginning Sanitization
[-] Cleaning the working directory
[-] Decompiling the APK
dex2jar DWApp.apk -> outJar.jar
[-] Generating random class name
[-] Aspect Name: aspectd138229
[-] Finding the classes which call: "query"
[-] Preparing the environment...
[-] Weaving aspect from just .class files..:
[-] 8 warnings
[-] Now we have the jar.. let's generate a dex!
[-] jar2dex ./target/classes/post-compile-time/output.jar -> classes.dex
[-] call com.android.dx.command.Main.main[--dex, --no-strict, -output=/Users/cdstelly/Code/Android/Thesis/Sanitizer/classes.dex,
/Users/cdstelly/Code/Android/Thesis/Sanitizer/target/classes/post-compiletime/output.jar]
[-] updating: classes.dex
[-]
zip warning: Local Entry CRC does not match CD: classes.dex
(deflated 60%)
[-] Signing the apk
[-] sign DWApp.apk -> DWApp-signed.apk
[-] Removing the currently installed application..
[-] * daemon not running. starting it now on port 5037 *
[-] * daemon started successfully *
[-] Success
[-] Installing the modified version..
2151 KB/s (3255732 bytes in 1.477s)
pkg: /data/local/tmp/DWApp-signed.apk
[-] Success

Figure 4-2 Sample Sanitization

Case Studies
DW Contacts
DW Contacts is a free application aimed at enhancing or replacing the standard
phone application packaged within Android [22]. Most features advertised relate to
accessing and communicating contacts quickly and efficiently, whether via SMS, MMS,
email, or a normal phone conversation.
This application was chosen due to its large volume of downloads (up to 5 million)
as well as an easy way to show the ability to provide fake information
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Figure 4-4 DW Contacts
(Instrumented)

Figure 4-3 DW Contacts
(Unmodified)

In Figure 4-3, we see normal operation of the application – loading of contact names.
After instrumenting the application’s bytecode, launching the application results in the
screen presented in Figure 4-4. The user has been notified with the standard Android
notification system; optionally, an alert is fired, and an icon appears in the top left of the
status bar.
Upon inspection of the notification (i.e., pulling down the notification bar), the
following selection is presented to the user (Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-55 Notification contacts were accessed
(Instrumented)

Three options are
displayed: Allow, Fake,
and Deny. Selecting the
notification itself will
take the user to the
SanitizerSettings
application, where he can
select to allow, fake, or
block data.
As
show
previously with Figure 33,, the user is able to
modify
the
privacy
settings of any sanitized
app he has installed. After
saving, he should restart
the app she
sh is trying to
modify the settings of.
This is not strictly
necessary, but should be
done to clear anything

the app has cached.
If she selected the option to fake all contact information for DW Contacts, the next
time she runs the app he could expect to see the image in Figure 4-6.
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Fictitious data has been given to
the application. This will ensure that
even though we are modifying the
application to protect our privacy, the
application will continue to behave as
normal.
As the fictitious data resides in
userspace, it could be modified at any
time. Thus, it is possible to populate the
database with ‘masked’ data, which
could prove to be a useful middle
ground
between
privacy
and
application usability. Masked data could
take the form of contacts which last
names were all replaced with a mask
character, such as the letter ‘x’.

Figure 4-3 DW Contacts with fictitious contacts
(instrumented)

Super-Bright LED Flashlight
In our case studies used to describe the permissions issue, we looked at the ‘SuperBright LED Flashlight’ app [20]. Since it has been installed up to 500 million times, or one in
five Android devices worldwide, it is worth a deeper look.
Prior to download, the following permissions are required:
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Your location
precise location (GPS and network-based)
approximate location (network-based)
Network communication
view network connections
full network access
view Wi-Fi connections
receive data from Internet
Phone calls
read phone status and identity
Storage
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
Your applications information
retrieve running apps
Camera
take pictures and videos
Development tools
change system display settings
System tools
modify system settings
test access to protected storage
Affects Battery
control flashlight
prevent device from sleeping
Figure 4-4 Permissions required for installation of "Super Bright LED Flashlight"

The number of permissions is too many – there is only one required for a flashlight
app, and that is “control flashlight”. With network and camera access, this application has
the facility to execute the PlaceRaider attacks as discussed earlier. The application is adsupported, however, and as such can reasonably require network access. On the other
hand, the application also has the ability to upload information with ‘full network access’.
Clearly, this application is over-provisioned.
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Figure 4-5 Super-Bright LED Flashlight
(Unmodified)

We immediately notice the ads at the bottom - this is the plausible cause for full
Internet permissions.. However, without doing anything remotely close to network traffic
analysis, one can simply look at the standard debugging output of the application
lication when
running to see that it is sending off the device id and several kinds of private information
off to an ad service.

Figure 4-6 Logcat Output: Device ID being given to an ad service, along with other encrypted strings
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This is in addition to several encrypted strings appearing in the standard output. We
do know that the app requires exact GPS location permissions, so it is possible that it is
encrypting your location (for use with the ads, hopefully).
Applying the same sanitization process to the flashlight apk, we were able to block
all network access. The effects of this are at least twofold: 1) the application cannot upload
any information about the device, and 2) ads are no longer displayed.

Figure 4-7 FlashlightApp (Instrumented)

This application is a prime example of why these kinds of apps should have a more
versatile permissions model. When we trust an application with any combination of
permissions including full network access, we must be wary of the possible consequences.
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5. Critique of Methods
While we achieve the goal of implementing dynamic privacy controls, we have
discovered drawbacks with our method. These include:
•
•
•

•
•

Advanced obfuscation techniques inhibit ability to recompile some
applications
To install these apps, we must resign other people’s work
If the device’s available memory runs low, the permission watching service
could be killed and the user will not be notified until restarting the service or
device
When Android eventually implements required permissions to read/write
the SD card, we will have to add that permission to the application’s manifest
Many apps are advertiser based; this method can prevent ads from running

Many developers obfuscate their application’s code prior to release. This is an
effective way to prevent reverse engineers from immediately realizing the purpose of a
given method. Our design takes this into account as we consider the fact that Android API
calls cannot be obfuscated – to utilize certain functionality, you must use the methods
provided. What was unaccounted for, however, was the inability for our decompilation and
recompilation tool (dex2jar) to handle obfuscation techniques. The dex2jar suite works
well in most cases of obfuscation, but for some apps (such as Google Chrome), the
recompilation process did not work as planned. Although the decompilation and weaving
processes worked as intended, more research into this, or perhaps a future update of the
dex2jar tool, are required to provide a completely robust solution.
One consideration our work brings to light is that in order to install the modified
application, we must re-sign the original developer’s work as any modifications break the
original developer’s signature. From a functional standpoint, this is no problem. However,
original developers can be understandably displeased with such actions.
In order to utilize the run-time warnings that notify the user when a sensitive
resource is active, we deploy a service that runs in the background processes of the device.
Once the aspect is accessed, the warning comes from this service vice weaved code. As all
devices are constantly trying to conserve battery, they periodically kill inactive services.
While this behavior was not witnessed when testing, the shutdown of the service would
prevent the user from being warned their information was being accessed. However, the
aspects would continue to function as normal and would follow any settings already set in
place.
Once side effect we introduce is that advertisements can be effectively disabled
when we deny network access to an application. An issue worthy of a debate in itself, this
can be seen as both a fantastic side effect for end users and as a negative consequence for
developers who are financially supported by advertisements.
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6. Conclusion
Mobile devices are increasingly trusted with information of both corporate and
personal varieties. The largest platform by far, Android, has not even come close to
implementing an exemplary security model with regards to protection of this information.
Likewise, protection for hardware sensors on Android devices has fallen by the wayside.
The lack of protection falls well short of user needs while simultaneously presents a
serious security threat.
A variety of causes contribute to the lack of protection. Statically assigned
permissions, which must be agreed upon prior to application installation, cannot be
changed at any time. Rampant numbers of apps are over-provisioned, each asking for
ludicrous access to personal information or completely unrelated hardware sensors.
This is a well-known set of problems, and prior solutions have approached it from
the ground up; that is, they have focused on implementing reasonable security policies
within Android’s open source kernel. While these solutions have achieved the goals of
improving Android with such security policies, they are severely hampered by the way in
which they have implemented them; the re-writing of operating system source code is
unnecessary and burdensome.
Alternatively, other prior work has implemented improvements to the security
model at the application layer, within userspace, bypassing the excessive drawbacks
caused by operating system modification. This prior work, however, could be improved
upon by use of standard, well-understood technologies, as well as expansion of goals and
implementation.
Our research, instantiated in the form of AppSanitizer, provides an ideal solution for
implementation of reasonable security policies within Android. These policies revert the
static nature of permission assignment, while simultaneously giving the user the power to
grant and revoke individual permissions on a per-application basis. For permissions that
access information, such as contacts, AppSanitizer can reliably return fictitious data.
AppSanitizer is also automated, providing an additional advantage for this approach.
The main benefit of this work is the grant to a user the ability to control whether or
not an application can access a protected resource, post-install time, without modifying the
operating system.
Future Work
Future work could implement the sanitization process on the device itself,
bypassing the need for ad-hoc installation and instrumentation. Because this solution likely
requires root access of the device, an alternative may be to provide the sanitation of apps
as a web service.
In a different light, the ability to easily instrument Android apps is not limited to
improvement of security policies. This approach can be used in a variety of situations;
almost any behavior can be implemented if an appropriate aspect is written.
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